The PDS500 is an RTU, it was developed by Hunter Water Tech, that was a company that spun out of Hunter Water Corporation. This was a popular thing to do here in Australia, and was also done by Melbourne Water with the Logica RTUs, and Mosaic SCADA.
The PDS500 (and the engineering arm of Hunter Water Tech) was then bought by Serck Controls, who then bought Control Microsystems (CMI). The SCADAPack E-series is something of a 'progression' of the PDS500. Serck were then bought up by Schneider.. hence this is now where the SCADAPack family lives.
As for the URL for 'Hunter Water Tech'... this is probably the closest (the water authority that still carries the name).
https://www.hunterwater.com.au/
The PDS500 really only supported Modbus and DNP3. But the Maroochy Shire SEWER spills (they were not water) were not a protocol level exploit, but a basic network intrusion attack.
There was no 'real' security, it was security through obscurity. You'd have to know the frequencies of the transmissions, and know what radios they were using (and have access to such a radio), then you'd need to know the protocol (DNP3) and what addresses were of interest (both DNP3 Node numbers, and DNP3 point numbers).
Of course the particular person that enacted the intrusions was a former engineer involved with the council, and so knew these details, and had access to such a radio. Making it a relatively trivial attack.
The part that surprises me is that he was actually caught. It would have been an incredibly difficult situation for Hunter Water Tech to identify the cause of the issues.
Most of the 'cybersecurity' postmortems that I've seen around the incident are really misplaced in my opinion. Things like 'Hunter Water Tech had inadequate physical security, allowing Vitek to steal a PDS500'... The real failure was that the entire network was secured through obscurity, not actual control measures. There are still likely thousands of similar deployments within Australia that are STILL configured in exactly the same way.
